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Small-scale pig producers are believed to pose higher biosecurity risks for the intro-
duction and spread of exotic diseases than commercial pig producers. However, the 
magnitude of these risks is poorly understood. This study is a comparative assessment 
of the risk of introduction and spread of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) through different 
sectors of the pig industry: (1) large-scale pig producers; (2) small-scale producers (<100 
sows) selling at saleyards and abattoirs; and (3) small-scale producers selling through 
informal means. An exposure and consequence assessments were conducted using the 
World Organization for Animal Health methodology for risk analysis, assuming FMD virus 
was introduced into Australia through illegal importation of infected meat. A quantitative 
assessment, using scenario trees and Monte Carlo stochastic simulation, was used to 
calculate the probabilities of exposure and spread. Input data for these assessments 
were obtained from a series of data gathering exercises among pig producers, industry 
statistics, and literature. Findings of this study suggest there is an Extremely low prob-
ability of exposure (8.69 × 10−6 to 3.81 × 10−5) for the three sectors of the pig industry, 
with exposure through direct swill feeding being 10–100 times more likely to occur than 
through contact with infected feral pigs. Spread of FMD from the index farm is most likely 
to occur through movement of contaminated fomites, pigs, and ruminants. The virus is 
more likely to spread from small-scale piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs than 
from other piggeries. The most influential factors on the spread of FMD from the index 
farm is the ability of the farmer to detect FMD, the probability of FMD spread through 
contaminated fomites and the presence of ruminants on the farm. Although small-scale 
producers selling informally move animals less frequently and do not use external staff, 
movement of pigs to non-commercial pathways could jeopardize animal traceability in 
the event of a disease outbreak. This study suggests that producers’ awareness on 
and engagement with legislative and industry requirements in relation to biosecurity and 
emergency animal disease management needs to be improved. Results from this study 
could be used by decision-makers to prioritize resource allocation for improving animal 
biosecurity in the pig industry.
Keywords: biosecurity, surveillance, emergency animal disease management, risk assessment, foot-and-mouth 
disease
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inTrODUcTiOn
Small landholders are commonly thought to pose biosecurity 
risks to mainstream livestock production, although the mag-
nitude and significance of these risks have not been previously 
evaluated. Practices of small-scale pig producers are believed to 
be associated with a higher risk of introduction and spread of 
exotic diseases than those of larger producers (1–5). Previous 
research suggests that small-scale pig producers selling at live-
stock markets (saleyards) had poor on-farm biosecurity practices, 
poor disease knowledge and understanding of swill feeding, and 
limited veterinary contact (6–11). Similar concerns in relation 
to biosecurity and animal disease management were reported 
in a qualitative study among small-scale pig producers selling 
through informal means in Australia conducted in 2009, which 
provided an insight into the implementation of and attitudes 
toward biosecurity among this sector of the industry (12).
Characteristics of Australia, such as geographical isolation and 
quarantine procedures, provide the country with a privileged dis-
ease free status for major livestock diseases, like foot-and-mouth 
disease (FMD). However, the potential for the introduction of 
exotic diseases still exists. Illegal introduction of meat products 
by incoming passengers from infected countries is the highest risk 
source of entry of FMD into Australia (13–15). Between 1997 and 
2000, there was a 29% increase in declared and detected animal 
products brought by passengers entering Australia from FMD-
infected countries and for the highest risk group of countries the 
increase was 43% (14). Pigs are highly susceptible to FMD and 
once infected excrete high concentrations of the virus in aerosol 
form, being considered a major amplifying host for this disease 
(16). Feeding of infected meat scraps has been identified as one 
of the major pathways of introducing FMD into a free country 
(13, 15, 17). The source of a FMD outbreak in South Africa in 
2000 was meat scraps from a ship’s garbage being fed to pigs (18) 
and during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, a 
small-scale pig farm where unprocessed pig swill was fed to pigs, 
was considered the source case of the virus introduction (19). 
Similarly than for FMD, illegal introduction of meat products 
and subsequent swill feeding has also been suggested as the 
cause of outbreaks of classical swine fever (CSF) in the European 
Union in the 2000s and the introduction of African swine fever 
(ASF) in Eastern Europe in 2007 (20, 21). Previous studies have 
investigated the risk of introduction of and subsequent exposure 
to emergency animal diseases, such as FMD, CSF, and ASF, from 
the illegal importation of meat products (20, 22, 23). Hartnett 
et al. (22) quantified the risk of FMD introduction and exposure 
in Great Britain and Costard et al. (20) assessed the risk of ASF 
introduction and exposure in Europe. In both studies, poor bios-
ecurity practices, especially among backyard producers and the 
presence of feral pigs were identified as highly influential on the 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to these viruses.
The Productivity Commission (14) and Buetre et  al. (24) 
assessed the impact of an FMD outbreak in Australia, considering 
a number of outbreaks of varying intensity. The most significant 
consequence of an FMD outbreak in Australia, independently of 
the location within the country, would be the immediate closure 
of the export market of livestock products to FMD-free countries, 
such as Japan and United States of America, which would remain 
for at least 3  months after eradication. The direct economic 
impacts of a FMD outbreak in Australia would be mainly due 
to the cost of control and eradication and a loss of revenue to 
affected livestock commodities from a decrease in export and 
domestic sales. The most recent assessment estimated a direct 
economic impact of $5.6 to $51.8 billion over a 10-year period, 
depending on the size of the outbreak. In addition, these financial 
effects would also have significant social impacts at an individual, 
household, and community levels, such as mental health issues 
and reduced welfare and well-being (24).
Spread of disease from the index farm will depend on on-
farm biosecurity practices and animal movement patterns of pig 
enterprises. Understanding these practices among the different 
sectors of the pig industry is crucial to assess the risk of exotic 
disease introduction and spread posed by each of these sectors. 
This study conducts a comparative exposure and partial conse-
quence assessment among different sectors of the pig industry 
in Australia. The aim of this study is to investigate how the FMD 
virus, which is assumed to be introduced into the country through 
illegal importation of contaminated meat, could exposure pigs 
at the index piggery and subsequently spread from this piggery. 
The sectors of the pig industry considered are: (1) large-scale 
or mainstream pig producers; (2) small-scale producers (<100 
sows) selling through saleyards and abattoirs; and (3) small-scale 
producers selling through informal means. These assessments 
quantify the nature and magnitude of the biosecurity risks posed 
by each sector of the pig industry. This information could support 
decision-makers for the prioritization of resources allocation for 
improving biosecurity in the pig industry.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
exposure and consequence  
assessment Models
This comparative risk assessment follows the World Organization 
for Animal Health (OIE) methodology for risk analysis (25) and 
uses scenario tree models to represent the potential pathways of 
exposure and spread and subsequently calculate the correspond-
ing probabilities of these occurring. Scenario trees provide an 
effective way of identifying pathways and information require-
ments and a framework for a quantitative analysis (26, 27).
An entry assessment as outlined by the OIE risk analysis 
methodology was not performed in this study as this assessment 
assumed that FMD had already been introduced into Australia. 
The assumption was that the virus was introduced through 
illegal importation of FMD-infected salted or cured meat and an 
estimated amount of introduced infected meat per year of 5 kg 
was used. The exposure assessment describes the potential path-
ways for pigs from the three different types of piggeries getting 
exposed to the FMD virus and estimates the probability of these 
pathways to occur. The partial consequence assessment describes 
the potential pathways of spread of FMD virus from the index 
farm and estimates the probability of this spread occurring. The 
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assessment of the impacts of the resulting FMD outbreaks after 
virus introduction is not reported in this manuscript. The sce-
nario trees were implemented in Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows 
XP, 2006) and probabilities were determined using Monte Carlo 
stochastic simulation modeling with the @RISK software (@Risk 
6.0, Palisade Corporation, USA). The outcome probabilities for 
each pathway of exposure and spread were calculated as a prod-
uct of all conditional probabilities describing the nodes of each 
specific pathway. The overall probability of exposure and spread 
for each type of piggery were obtained by adding the probabilities 
for each of the exposure and spread pathways, respectively, given 
these pathways are independent (27). Each simulation consisted 
of 50,000 iterations sampled using the Latin hypercube method 
with a fixed random seed of one.
Population Framework
Different definitions on small-scale pig producers can be found. 
The Australian pig body representative, Australian Pork Limited 
(APL), defines small landholder as those pig producers with less 
or equal than 50 sows and/or trading less or equal to 1000 pigs 
per year (28). Biosecurity Australia in their Import Risk Analysis 
for Pig Meat (13) classified backyard pig producers as those with 
less than 10 sows, small pig-producing enterprises those with 
between 10 and 99 sows, and commercial enterprises those with 
more than 99 sows. This classification was based on the assump-
tion that management practices, such as feeding, husbandry, and 
motivation to keep pigs, where significantly different between 
these groups. Research into small- scale pig producers trading 
via saleyards in eastern Australia has shown no differences on 
on-farm practices among producers with 1–100 sows (8).
For the purpose of this assessment, small-scale pig produc-
ers are those with less than 100 sows with those piggeries with 
more than 100 sows being defined as commercial enterprises. 
Moreover, this assessment considers the differences on livestock 
trade patterns among small-scale pig producers as some livestock 
movements could pose higher risk for disease transmission. As a 
consequence, small-scale producers were subsequently classified 
into two groups; those selling through saleyards and abattoirs, 
and those selling mainly through informal means. Informal sales 
included internet, word-of-mouth, family and friends, and local 
businesses.
Data Sources
Data used to populate the exposure and partial consequence 
assessments were obtained from different data gathering exercises, 
published literature, and industry statistics. Below is a description 
of the data gathering exercises to collect information to populate 
the models used in these assessments.
Postal Questionnaire, Interviews, and Focus Groups with Pig 
Producers Selling through Saleyards in Eastern Australia
A three-part study involving pig producers at six saleyards situ-
ated in eastern Australia was conducted in a 12-month period 
starting at the end of 2006 (6). The first part of the study was 
the distribution of a postal questionnaire, which gathered basic 
data on the demographics and husbandry practices, among all 
producers who traded pigs at saleyards during the 2005 calendar 
year (n = 815). The second part of the study involved face-to-face 
interviews with producers (n = 106) who indicated their willing-
ness to participate during the postal questionnaire, along with 
volunteers opportunistically recruited from the study saleyards. 
The interview collected detailed information on demographics, 
husbandry practices, nutrition, herd health, biosecurity practices, 
movement practices, animals identification systems, and com-
munication networks (8, 9, 35, 42, 43). The final part of the study 
consisted in nine one-off focus group discussions, with 5–12 
producers in each discussion, to investigate in depth attitudes 
and behaviors of producers toward diseases, disease reporting, 
traceability, and communication networks (6, 42–44). Focus 
group participants (n = 34) were recruited on a voluntary basis 
from face-to-face interviews and from advertisements placed at 
the saleyards and in stock agent newsletters. This study included 
mainly small-scale producers selling through saleyards although 
there were a small proportion of large-scale producers and small-
scale producers selling through informal means.
Case Study Interviews and Questionnaires with Small-Scale 
Pig Producers Selling through Informal Means
To improve our understanding of practices of small-scale pig 
producers selling by informal means (internet, word-of-mouth, 
family and friends, and local businesses), a total of 13 small-
scale (≤100 sows) pig producers using this marketing strategy 
were interviewed in New South Wales (12). This questionnaire, 
which was distributed using face-to-face interviews, gathered 
in-depth information on demographics and practices on 
husbandry, feeding, herd and health management, biosecurity, 
and pig movements. Producers were recruited at agricultural 
shows and through stage government databases. In addition, to 
collect supporting data in relation to practices of this sector of 
the pig industry, a shorter questionnaire covering similar topics 
was developed to be distributed by post among members of the 
Australian Pig Breeders Association (n =  29) and face-to-face 
among participants (n = 24) of pig industry field days.
Exposure Assessment
This assessment evaluates the probability of exposure of a pig 
from a piggery to FMD-infected meat that has been illegally 
introduced into the country. The assessment considers that 
the FMD-infected meat could end up in any household in the 
country, with or without pigs. Four different pathways have been 
identified as potential pathways of exposure of a pig at an index 
piggery for each of the three piggery types (small-scale piggery 
selling by informal means; small-scale piggery selling at saleyards 
and abattoirs; or large-scale piggery), depending on: (1) the type 
of household where the meat is destined to; (2) the proportion of 
waste discarded from this meat; (3) the involvement of feral pigs 
in the pathway; and (4) the probability of pig producers feeding 
swill to their pigs. These pathways of exposure are:
• Exposure 1: The FMD-infected meat ends up in a household 
without pigs and some of this meat is discarded as waste. This 
waste is then accessible to feral pigs and these pigs become 
infected with FMD. As the final step of the pathway, the 
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FMD-infected meat 
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Yes
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FigUre 1 | scenario tree representing the exposure pathways of a domestic pig from a small-scale piggery (<100 sows) selling through saleyards 
and abattoirs to foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus from FMD-infected meat illegally introduced into australia.
4
Hernández-Jover et al. Biosecurity Risks in Australian Piggeries
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org September 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 85
infected feral pigs travel to the index piggery getting in contact 
with domestic pigs from this piggery.
• Exposure 2: The FMD-infected meat ends up in the index 
piggery and some of this meat is discarded as waste. This waste 
is then fed directly to the domestic pigs in the piggery.
• Exposure 3: The FMD-infected meat ends up in the index 
piggery and some of this meat is discarded as waste. This waste 
is then accessible to feral pigs around the piggery and these 
pigs become infected with FMD. The feral pigs get in contact 
with domestic pigs from the same piggery.
• Exposure 4: The FMD-infected meat ends up in a non-index 
piggery, and some of this meat is discarded as waste. This waste 
is then accessible to feral pigs and these pigs become infected 
with FMD. The infected feral pigs travel to the index piggery 
getting in contact with domestic pigs from this piggery.
A scenario tree was developed to represent these four path-
ways of exposure and the same structure of the scenario tree was 
used for modeling the risk of FMD exposure among the three 
groups of pig producers considered in this study. Figure 1 repre-
sents the scenario tree considering a small-scale piggery selling 
through saleyards and abattoirs is the index piggery. Some of 
the parameter estimates and input values differed between the 
three groups of pig producers. Table  1 summarizes the nodes 
used for the exposure scenario tree and a detailed description of 
the nodes and input parameters used are provided in the online 
supplemental material.
Consequence Assessment
Once the first pig from a piggery (small- or large scale) is exposed 
to the FMD virus, different potential outbreak scenarios could 
occur depending on different factors. This partial consequence 
assessment evaluates the potential outbreak scenarios and their 
corresponding probabilities occurring. The main factors consid-
ered in the consequence assessment are the ability of the farmer to 
detect the disease, the presence of ruminants on the farm and the 
movement of animals, fomites, and people from the index farm. 
In the event that the infection in the index farm is not detected, 
the virus could spread beyond this property. Six main outbreak 
scenarios have been identified:
• Scenario 1: This scenario represents no spread beyond the index 
farm, which could occur in different situations: (1) in a piggery 
TaBle 1 | nodes, parameter estimates, and input values used for the exposure assessment estimating the probability of a piggery being exposed to FMD-infected meat illegally introduced into 
australia through incoming passengers from overseas.
name Outcome Parameter estimates input value Data sources
1 Household 
type
Without pigs Proportion of households with and without pigs in 
Australia (Prop_withPigs; Prop_withoutPigs)
Total households: Pert (8.7, 9.2, 9.6 M)
Households with pigs: large piggery (>100 sows) + small piggery + growers
• Large piggery: 315
• Growers: 524
• Small piggery: Pert (1409, 1550, 620)
(8, 29, 30)
With pigs
2 Proportion of 
waste
Waste Number of serves in 5 kg of meat Single serve size of meat: average, 50 g (25–100 g), Pert (0.025, 0.05, 0.1) (13, 31)
No waste Proportion of meat discarded as waste 
(Prop_waste)
Number of serves in 5 kg of meat: 5 kg/single serve size
Prop_Waste: Pert (0.01, 0.02, 0.05)
3 Piggery type Large piggery  
(> 100 sows)
Proportion of large and small-scale piggeries in 
Australia (Prop_Small; Prop_Large)
Large-scale piggeries: 839 (315 breeding, 524 contract growers)
Small-scale piggeries: Pert (1071, 1178, 1232)
(8)
Small piggery  
(<100 sows)
4 Small-scale 
piggery type
Selling informally Proportion of these two types of piggeries among 
small-scale piggeries (Prop_Informal; Prop_Sal&Ab)
Number small-scale piggeries: 589 Number of small-scale piggeries selling 
informally: Pert [Beta (38,553), +50%, 
+70%] (8, 12); Questionnaire with 
specific groups of pigs producers
Selling through 
saleyards and 
abattoirs
Number of small-scale piggeries selling informally: Pert [Beta (38,553), +50%, 
+70%]
5 Access of feral 
pigs to waste
Yes Probability of waste from households without pigs 
getting in contact with feral pigs (Prob_Access1); 
probability of waste from piggeries getting in 
contact with feral pigs (Prob_Access2)
Prop_Access1 = Cumul (Probability access and located, Proportion of 
households in different areas)
• Probability of access and located = Probability of waste being accessible 
[High (Uniform (0.7, 1)) in remote areas, Moderate (Uniform (0.3, 0.7)) in 
rural areas and Very low (Uniform (0.001, 0.05)) at large towns] × Probability 
of waste being located by the feral pigs Very low [Uniform (0.001, 0.05)] in 
remote areas, Extremely low [Uniform (0.000001, 0.001)] in rural areas and 
Negligible [Uniform (0, 0.000001)] at large towns
• Proportion of households: 3% remote, 11% rural, and 86% large towns
Prob_Access2 = Pert (Prob_Access1, +15%, +20%)
(13)
No
6 Infection of 
feral pigs
Yes Probability of the feral pigs being infected once they 
are in contact with the FMD-contaminated waste 
(Prob_Infection)
Prob_Infection = Probability of the infected meat contains sufficient dose to 
cause infection of feral pigs High [Uniform (0.7, 1)] × Viability of the virus in the 
infected waste until the feral pig contacts with this waste High [Uniform (0.7, 1)]
(13, 15)
No
7 Contact of 
feral pigs with 
domestic pigs
Yes
No
Probability feral pigs infected via waste from other 
households contact pigs from the index piggery 
(Prob_Contact1); probability feral pigs infected via 
waste originated in the index piggery contact pigs 
from the same piggery (Prob_Contact2)
Prob_Contact2 = Proportion of producers reporting feral pigs around their 
property [Small-scale saleyard and abattoir, Beta (46, 127); small-scale selling 
informally, Beta (6, 17)]; large-scale, Pert (max–50%, max-20%, 23/149)
(8, 12); Questionnaire with specific 
groups of pigs producers
Prob_Contact1 = Pert (−50%, −20%, Prob_Contact2)
8 Swill feeding Yes
No
Probability of swill feeding (Prob_Swill) among 
producers
Small-scale selling through saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (Most likely – 50%, 
19/109, Most likely +20%)
(8, 9, 12); Questionnaire with specific 
groups of pigs producers
Small-scale selling informally: Pert (Most likely – 50%, 5/22, Most likely +20%)
Large-scale: Pert (Most likely – 50%, 6/41, Most likely +20%)
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with pigs only, when infection is detected and reported; (2) in 
a piggery with pigs and ruminants, when infection is detected 
in both species and reported; (3) in a piggery with pigs only, 
when infection is not detected, but there are no movement of 
pigs off the farm during the infective period either movements 
of contaminated fomites. In this last situation, the infection 
would die out before spread occurs. If ruminants are kept on 
the farm, these are very likely to become infected before FMD 
is detected in pigs and moved off the farm (see Scenario 5).
• Scenario 2: Infection is not detected (in pigs and ruminants) 
at the first exposed piggery and FMD virus is spread through 
movement of pigs off farm. This spread could be more or less 
significant and at local, regional, or national level, depending 
on the destination of the animals. Within Scenario 2, further 
scenarios were identified depending on the destination of the 
animals moving from the index farm when the infection is 
initially not detected by the farmer. These scenarios slightly 
differed between small and large-scale piggeries, and are 
described in Table 2.
• Scenario 3: Infection in the first exposed piggery is spread 
through movement of contaminated fomites. Spread through 
fomites can happen independently of farmer detection. If the 
farmer does not detect, spread of the virus to other proper-
ties through contaminated fomites is more likely than when 
detection occurs. However, if detection is delayed, spread 
through fomites can still happen. For this assessment, fomites 
were defined as mechanical vectors and included vehicles, 
equipment, and clothing.
• Scenario 4: Infection in the first exposed piggery is spread 
through movement of people carrying infective virus particles 
in the respiratory tract. As the previous scenario, spread 
through contaminated people is more likely to happen when 
the farmer does not detect the infection. When detection 
occurs but it is in late stages of the infection, spread through 
people could also be possible. Spread through people carry-
ing the virus was considered separate to the spread through 
fomites as a person could be contaminated despite biosecurity 
measures being applied to avoid spread through fomites (e.g., 
disinfection of equipment).
• Scenario 5: Infection is not detected by the farmer (in pigs 
and ruminants) in the first exposed piggery and FMD virus is 
spread through movement of ruminants off farm. Even when 
infection is detected in pigs, movement of infected ruminants 
off the farm could occur before infection is detected in pigs. 
This spread could be more or less significant at a local, regional, 
or national level, depending on the destination of the animals. 
Information on the movement of ruminants off the farm, such 
as potential destinations and frequency of movements, was not 
collected during this assessment. However, information on the 
presence and number of ruminants kept on the farm was used 
to evaluate the likelihood of the spread through ruminant 
movement.
• Scenario 6: Infection in the first exposed piggery is spread 
through airborne transmission. Airborne transmission of 
FMD has been extensively investigated in the past (45, 46). It 
was not the objective of this assessment to assess the potential 
spread of FMD through airborne transmission as this could 
occur independently of the biosecurity practices of the piggery, 
evaluation of which is the main objective of this assessment.
Two different consequence scenario trees were developed to 
represent the previously described potential outbreak scenarios 
for small and large-scale piggeries. The only difference in the 
structure of these scenario trees was the potential destinations 
where pigs from the index farm could go once moved off the 
farm. Figure 2 represents the consequence scenario tree used for 
modeling the probability of FMD spread from small-scale pig 
producers. Table  3 describes the nodes, input values and data 
sources used for the small-scale piggery consequence scenario 
tree. A description of the scenario tree used for the conse-
quence assessment for large-scale piggeries is shown in Table 4. 
A detailed description of the nodes and input parameters used 
for both consequence assessments are provided in the online 
supplemental material.
sensitivity analysis
The influence of some input parameters on the model outputs 
was investigated using the @Risk Advanced Sensitivity Analysis 
(@RISK 6.0, Palisade Corporation, USA). For the probability of 
exposure for each piggery type, the input parameters evaluated 
were the probability of pig producers swill feeding (Prob_Swill) 
and the amount of meat illegally introduced into Australia. For 
investigating which practices had the most influence on the 
probability of spread of the virus, the following spread scenarios 
were included in the sensitivity analysis: Scenario 1 (no spread 
beyond the index farm), Scenario 2 (spread through movement 
of pigs), Scenario 3 (spread through contaminated fomites), 
and Scenario 5 (spread through movement of ruminants). 
The input parameters investigated were the probability of the 
farmer detecting FMD in pigs (Prob_1stDet) and ruminants 
(Prob_1stDet_Rum), the presence of ruminants on the farm 
(Prop_Rum), the probability of FMD transmission through con-
taminated fomites moving off the index farm (Prob_Fomites), 
and the probability of movement of pigs (Prob_MovPigs) and 
ruminants (Prob_MovRum) off the farm.
Probability input values were allowed to vary from 0 to 1 in 
tenths (0.1, 0.2, 0.3…) and the values used for the amount of meat 
illegally introduced into Australia were 10, 50, 100, and 200 kg. 
Each of the values for each input parameter was evaluated sepa-
rately in a simulation of 5,000 iterations, while values for all other 
input variables were fixed to the base value.
resUlTs
exposure assessment results
The exposure assessment evaluated potential pathways of 
exposure of a pig from a piggery to FMD-infected meat illegally 
introduced into Australia and estimated the probability of these 
pathways to occur. Four potential exposure pathways were 
identified in this assessment, which were mainly dependent 
on the type of household in Australia where the contaminated 
meat was destined to and the characteristics of these households. 
Description of the exposure pathways, the likelihood of each of 
these pathways to occur and the overall likelihood of exposure for 
TaBle 2 | a description of the potential scenarios of spread of FMD virus from an infected small-scale (<100 sows) or large-scale piggery in australia, 
due to movement of pigs off farm, according to different destinations.
scenario Piggery type Description
a Large/small scale Infected animals moving to another piggery (small-scale piggery for the small-scale scenario; large-scale piggery for the large-scale 
scenario) where the infection is detected and reported: this scenario represents limited spread to a local pig community, depending 
on movement of other animals from the index farm until infection is detected at the second piggery, time of the detection at the 
second piggery, the presence of ruminants at this piggery and the movement of animals from this piggery before detection
b Large/small scale Infected animals moving to another piggery (small-scale piggery for the small-scale scenario; large-scale piggery for the large-scale 
scenario) where the infection is not detected: this scenario represents spread of the infection. The magnitude of this spread will 
depend on other animal movements from the index farm, the presence of ruminants at the second piggery, and the movement of 
animals from this piggery
c Large scale Infected animals moving to a small-scale piggery where the infection is detected and reported: this scenario is similar than  
Scenario a; however, the spread would be more limited as there would be less animals that could get infected at the second piggery
d Large scale Infected animals moving to a small-scale piggery where the infection is not detected and infection is spread: this scenario is similar 
than Scenario b although the spread would be more limited due to the lower number of animals that would be affected and could 
move from the second piggery
e Small scale Infected animals are transferred to a person who keeps pigs as pets (private individual) and infection is detected and reported at this 
second location: this scenario represents limited spread to a local pig community. Similar than Scenario a, the extent of the spread 
will depend on other animal movements from the first exposed piggery until infection is reported by the private individual, time of the 
detection and reporting at this second location, the presence of ruminants at this location and the movement of other animals from 
this location before detection
f Small scale Infected animals are transferred to a person who keeps pigs as pets (private individual) and infection is not detected at this second 
location: this scenario represents spread of the infection. The magnitude of this spread will depend on other animal movements 
from the first exposed piggery, the presence of ruminants at the second location and the movement of animals from this location. It 
is assumed that the extent of the spread of this scenario would be less significant than in Scenario b as a private individual keeping 
pigs as pets is less likely to move these or other animals off the farm
g Small scale Infected animals moving to an agricultural show, where the infection is detected: in this scenario, once the infection is detected, all 
movements to and from the show would be stopped. Spread to animals attending the agricultural show and also outside the show 
can occur depending on time of detection and movement of animals, fomites, and people off the show before detection
h Small scale Infected animals moving to an agricultural show, where the infection is not detected: spread of the infection would be more 
significant than any of the previous scenarios. Animals attending agricultural shows can travel from the same region, the same 
state, and also from other states in Australia. If infection is not detected at the show, all susceptible livestock could be infected, 
and infection could spread to any of the locations where animals are moved from the show. The spread could affect all susceptible 
livestock species at a local, regional, and national level, depending on destination of animals from the show and time of detection of 
the infection once infected animals move from this agricultural show
i Small scale Infected animals moving to another property for home-kill: independently of detection, animals will be killed so spread will be very 
limited, and its extent will depend on other animal movements from the first exposed piggery, the period of time until the infected 
animal is killed at the second property and the presence of ruminants in this property
j Large/small scale Infected animals moving to a saleyard where infection is detected: in this scenario, once infection is detected, all movements to and 
from the saleyard would stop. Spread would be limited to the first exposed piggery and animals attending the saleyard; however, 
spread could go beyond the animals attending at the saleyards if movement of animals and fomites from the saleyard occur before 
the detection of the infection. The extent of the spread of this scenario will also depend on other animal movements from the first 
exposed piggery until the infection is detected at the saleyard
k Large/small scale Infected animals moving to a saleyard where infection is not detected: spread of the infection could be significant at local and 
regional levels, although national spread could also occur as animals travel interstate to be sold at saleyards. Thus, the extent of the 
spread will depend on other animal movements from the first exposed piggery, movements of animals, and contaminated fomites 
from the saleyard and presence of ruminants at the saleyard
l Large/Small-scale Infected animals moving to an abattoir where infection is detected: once infection is detected at the domestic abattoir, all 
movements to and from the abattoir would be disrupted. This scenario represents a locally limited spread to the first exposed 
piggery and animals attending at the abattoir. Animal movement from the abattoir is uncommon; however, contaminated vehicles 
could spread the infection if they move from the abattoir before the infection is detected. The extent of the spread of this scenario 
will also depend on other animal movements from the first exposed piggery until the infection is detected at the abattoir
m Large/small scale Infected animals moving to an abattoir where infection is not detected: in this scenario, non-detected infected animals would be 
slaughtered and spread would most likely be limited to the local community, depending on other animal movements from the first 
exposed piggery and movement of infected animals and fomites from the abattoir
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FigUre 2 | scenario tree used for a spread assessment investigating the potential outbreak scenarios of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) from a 
small-scale piggery (<100 sows) in australia.
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the three assessments (small-scale pig producers selling through 
informal means, small-scale pig producers selling at saleyards and 
abattoirs and large-scale pig producers) are presented in Table 5.
Results indicate that the most likely pathway of exposure to 
FMD-infected meat illegally introduced into Australia among 
the three types of piggeries is through the direct feeding of the 
infected meat to the pigs (Exposure 2). The probability of this 
exposure pathway to occur is extremely low (qualitative descrip-
tors based on Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis; DAFF, 2004), 
with one exposure estimated to occur for every 10,000–100,000 
times FMD-infected meat is illegally introduced into the country, 
depending on the type of piggery. The lowest value was estimated 
for small-scale piggeries selling informally as shown in Table 5. 
Probabilities of other pathways were considered to be negligible. 
Exposure 1, which represents the exposure through feral pigs 
which have been infected from contaminated waste from a 
household without pigs, has a higher probability to occur than the 
other two pathways, given most households in Australia do not 
have pigs (99.9%) and the illegally introduced meat is more likely 
to be destined to these households than households with pigs. 
The overall probability of exposure was estimated 8.69 ×  10−6, 
7.26  ×  10−5, and 3.81  ×  10−5 (extremely low), for small-scale 
piggeries selling informally, those selling through saleyards and 
abattoirs and large-scale piggeries, respectively. The probabilities 
of exposure among small-scale piggeries selling through sale-
yards and abattoirs and large-scale piggeries are slightly higher 
than that for small-scale piggeries selling informally, due to the 
higher number of producers within the former categories, and 
the higher potential contact between feral and domestic pigs in 
these piggeries.
This assessment considered that households without and with 
pigs had even probability of illegally introducing meat into the 
country. When evaluating the probability of exposure of the pigs 
to the infected meat, once this meat is introduced to the piggery 
of concern, a very low probability (0.003–0.005) was obtained for 
all piggery types, given most of this meat will be consumed and 
only a small proportion will be waste that could be fed to the pigs.
consequence assessment results
Following the exposure of a pig from a piggery, six main scenarios 
have been identified depending on the ability of the farmer to 
detect FMD and the movement of animals, fomites, and people 
from the index farm. These scenarios are the same for the three 
groups of pig producers.
TaBle 3 | nodes, parameter estimates, and input values used for the partial consequence assessment estimating the probability of potential outbreak scenarios after a small-scale (<100 sows) 
piggery has been exposed to FMD-infected meat illegally introduced into australia through incoming passengers from overseas.
node name Outcome Parameter estimates input value Data sources
1 Clinical signs Yes
No
Probability that an FMD-
infected animal would display 
clinical signs (Prob_CS; 
Prob_CS_2)
Incubation period: lognormal [5, 2.7, Truncate (1, 12)]; infective period: uniform (14, 30); Time to the onset of clinical 
signs = Incubation period – 2 days
(13, 15, 16)
Prob_CS = (Infective period – Incubation period)/Infective period
Prob_CS_2 = (Infective period – Time to the onset of clinical signs)/Infective period
2 Farmer detection 
and reporting 
in pigs
Detection Probability of the farmer from 
the index piggery detecting 
and reporting FMD in pigs 
for each type of piggery 
(Prob_1stDet)
Prob_1stDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer reporting
Probability of the farmer detection:
• Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (0.32, 0.4, 0.48)
• Small-scale selling informally: Pert (0.4, 0.5, 0.6)
Probability of farmer reporting:
• Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
• Small-scale selling informally: Pert (0.6, 0.75, 0.9)
(7, 8, 12); 
Questionnaire 
with specific 
groups of pigs 
producers
No detection
3 Presence of 
ruminants on the 
piggery
Yes Proportion of pig farms 
keeping also ruminants 
(Prop_Rum)
Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Beta (461,93) As Node 2
No Small-scale selling informally: Beta (33, 6)
4 Farmer detection 
& reporting in 
ruminants
Yes Probability of the farmer from 
the first exposed piggery 
detecting and reporting the 
FMD infection in ruminants 
(Prob_1stDet_Rum)
Prob_1stDet_Rum = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer reporting
Probability of the farmer detection:
• Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (Prob_1stDet, +10%, +20%)
• Small-scale selling informally: Pert (Prob_1stDet, +10%, +20%)
Probability of farmer reporting:
• Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
• Small-scale selling informally: Pert (0.6, 0.75, 0.9)
(15)
No
5 Pig movement 
during infective 
period
Yes Probability of pig movements 
during the infective period 
(Prob_MovPigs)
Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Pert (−20%, 0.6, +20%) As Node 2
No Small-scale selling informally: Pert (−20%, 0.3, +20%)
6 Ruminant 
movement 
during infective 
period
Yes Probability of ruminant 
movement during 
the infective period 
(Prob_MovRum)
Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Moderate [Uniform (0.3, 0.7)] As Node 2
No Small-scale selling informally: Low [Uniform (0.05, 0.3)]
(Continued)
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node name Outcome Parameter estimates input value Data sources
7 Pig movement 
from the index 
farm
Small scale Proportion of movement 
of pigs to each of these 
destinations (Prop_
SSpiggery; Prop_PrivateInd; 
Prop_AS; Prop_HK; Prop_
Saleyard; Prop_Abattoir)
Beta (n + 1, s − n + 1) for each proportion
Movements of small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs (n = 883):
• Small-scale piggery: 113
• Private Individual: 26
• Agricultural Show: 5
• Home-kill: 192
• Saleyard: 455
• Abattoir: 82
Movements of small-scale selling informally (n = 57):
• Small-scale piggery: 32
• Private Individual:10
• Agricultural Show: 4
• Home-kill: 0
• Saleyard: 0
• Abattoir: 1
As Node 2
Piggery
Private 
individual
Agricultural 
show
Home-kill
Saleyard
Abattoir
8 Ruminant 
movement from 
the index farm
Saleyard Proportion of movement 
of ruminants to each 
of these destinations 
(Prop_SaleyardRum; 
Prop_AbattoirRum; Prop_
Contractor; Prop_IndProp; 
Prop_Export)
Not estimated (32–34)
Abattoir
Contractor
Independent 
property
Export
9 Detection at 
small-scale 
piggery
Detection Probability that the farmer 
at the large-scale piggery 
receiving the infected pigs 
would detect infection 
(Prob_SSDet)
Prob_SSDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.32, 0.4, 0.48)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
As Node 2
No detection
10 Detection at 
private individual
Detection Probability that the farmer 
at the small-scale piggery 
receiving the infected pigs 
would detect infection 
(Prob_PrivateIndDet)
Prob_PrivateIndDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.32, 0.4, 0.48)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
As Node 2
No detection
11 Detection at 
agricultural show
Detection Probability of detection of 
FMD at agricultural shows 
(Prob_ASDet)
Prob_ASDet = SumProduct (Probability of detection at show type, Proportion of each show type)
• Proportion of show types depending on animal health responsible [Beta (n + 1, s − n + 1)]: Exhibitors only (17/59), 
Staff (25/59), Vet (17/59)
• Probability of detection at show type: Exhibitors only (Prob_1stDet), Staff [Pert (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)], Vet (1)
(35, 36)
No detection
12 Detection at 
home-kill
Detection Probability of detection of a 
FMD in properties for home-
kill (Prob_HKDet)
Prob_HKDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.32, 0.4, 0.48)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
As Node 2
No detection
TaBle 3 | continued
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node name Outcome Parameter estimates input value Data sources
13 Detection at 
saleyards
Detection Probability of detection 
of FMD at saleyards 
(Prob_SaleyardDet)
Prob_SaleyardDet = SumProduct (Probability of detection at saleyard type, Proportion of each saleyard type)
• Proportion of saleyard type: Domestic (10/13), Export (3/13)
• Probability of detection at saleyard type: Domestic (median, 0.475; 5–95%, 0.343–0.599), Export (0.474; 
0.334–0.603)
(35, 37)
No detection
14 Detection at 
abattoirs
Detection Probability of detection at 
pig domestic and export 
abattoirs (Prob_AbattoirDet)
Prob_AbattoirDet = SumProduct (Probability of detection at abattoir type, Proportion of each abattoir type)
• Proportion of saleyard type: Domestic (19/26), Export (7/26)
• Probability of detection at saleyard type: Domestic (0.430; 0.329–0.534), Export (0.861; 0.799–0.916)
(35, 37)
No detection
15 Movement of 
contaminated 
fomites from the 
index farm
Yes Probability of FMD 
transmission through 
contaminated fomites 
(Prob_Fomites)
Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Moderate [Uniform (0.3, 0.7)] As Node 2;  
(15, 38, 39)No Small-scale selling informally: Low [Uniform (0.05, 0.3)]
16 Movement of 
contaminated 
people from the 
index farma
Yes Probability of transmission 
through movement of 
people carrying the virus 
in their respiratory tract 
(Prob_People)
Small-scale selling at saleyards and abattoirs: Low [Uniform (0.05, 0.3)] As Node 2;  
(15, 40, 41)No Small-scale selling informally: Very low [Uniform (0.001, 0.05)]
aMovement of people carrying FMD infective particles in the upper respiratory tract.
TaBle 3 | continued
TaBle 4 | nodes, parameter estimates and input values used for the partial consequence assessment estimating the probability of potential outbreak scenarios after a large-scale (>100 sows) 
piggery has been exposed to FMD-infected meat illegally introduced into australia through incoming passengers from overseas.
node name Outcome Parameter estimates input values Data sources
1 Clinical signs Yes
No
Probability that an FMD-infected animal would 
display clinical signs (Prob_CS; Prob_CS_2)
Incubation period: lognormal [5, 2.7, Truncate (1, 12)]; infective period: uniform 
(14, 30); time to the onset of clinical signs = Incubation period – 2 days
(13, 15, 16)
Prob_CS = (Infective period – Incubation period)/Infective period
Prob_CS_2 = (Infective period – Time to the onset of clinical signs)/Infective 
period
2 Farmer detection & 
reporting in pigs
Detection Probability of the farmer from the index 
piggery detecting and reporting FMD in pigs 
(Prob_1stDet)
Prob_1stDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer 
reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.56, 0.7, 0.84)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.64, 0.80, 0.96)
(7, 8, 12); 
Questionnaire with 
specific groups of 
pigs producers
No detection
3 Presence of ruminant 
on the piggery
Yes Proportion of pig farms keeping also ruminants 
(Prop_Rum)
Beta (65, 24) As Node 2
No
4 Farmer detection 
and reporting in 
ruminants
Yes Probability of the farmer from the first exposed 
piggery detecting and reporting the FMD 
infection in ruminants (Prob_1stDet_Rum)
Prob_1stDet_Rum = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the 
farmer reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (Prob_1stDet, +10%, +20%)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.64, 0.80, 0.96)
(15)
No
(Continued)
11
H
ernández-Jover et al.
B
iosecurity R
isks in A
ustralian P
iggeries
Frontiers in Veterinary S
cience | w
w
w
.frontiersin.org
S
eptem
ber 2016 | Volum
e 3 | A
rticle 85
node name Outcome Parameter estimates input values Data sources
5 Pig movement 
during infective 
period
Yes Probability of pig movements during the infective 
period (Prob_MovPigs)
Pert (−10%, −5%, 1) As Node 2
No
6 Ruminant movement 
during infective 
period
Yes Probability of ruminant movement during the 
infective period (Prob_MovRum)
High [Uniform (0.7, 1)] As Node 2
No
7 Pig movement from 
the index farm
Large-scale piggery Proportion of movement of pigs to each of these 
destinations (Prop_LCpiggery; Prop_SCpiggery; 
Prop_Saleyard; Prop_Abattoir)
Large-scale piggery: Pert (−20%, 0.10, +20%) As Node 2
Small-scale piggery Small-scale piggery: Pert (−20%, 0.10, +20%)
Saleyard Saleyard: Pert (−20%, 0.15, +20%)
Abattoir Abattoir: Pert (−20%, 0.65, +20%)
8 Ruminant movement 
from the index farm
Saleyard Proportion of movement of ruminants to each of 
these destinations (Prop_SaleyardRum; Prop_
AbattoirRum; Prop_Contractor; Prop_IndProp; 
Prop_Export)
Not estimated (32–34)
Abattoir
Contractor
Independent property
Export
9 Detection and 
reporting at large-
scale piggery
Detection Probability that the farmer at the large-scale 
piggery receiving the infected pigs would detect 
infection (Prob_LSDet)
Prob_LSDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer 
reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.56, 0.7, 0.84)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.64, 0.80, 0.96)
As Node 2
No detection
10 Detection and 
reporting at small-
scale piggery
Detection Probability that the farmer at the small-scale 
piggery receiving the infected pigs would detect 
infection (Prob_SSDet)
Prob_SSDet = Probability of the farmer detection × Probability of the farmer 
reporting
• Probability of the farmer detection: Pert (0.32, 0.4, 0.48)
• Probability of farmer reporting: Pert (0.48, 0.6, 0.72)
As Node 2
No detection
11 Detection at 
saleyards
Detection Probability of detection of FMD at saleyards 
(Prob_SaleyardDet)
Prob_SaleyardDet = SumProduct (Probability of detection at saleyard type, 
Proportion of each saleyard type)
• Proportion of saleyard type: Domestic (10/13), Export (3/13)
• Probability of detection at saleyard type: Domestic (median, 0.475; 5–95%, 
0.343–0.599), Export (0.474; 0.334–0.603)
(35, 37)
No detection
12 Detection at 
abattoirs
Detection Probability of detection at pig domestic and 
export abattoirs (Prob_AbattoirDet)
Prob_AbattoirDet = SumProduct (Probability of detection at abattoir type, 
Proportion of each abattoir type)
• Proportion of saleyard type: Domestic (19/26), Export (7/26)
• Probability of detection at saleyard type: Domestic (0.430; 0.329–0.534), 
Export (0.861; 0.799–0.916)
(35, 37)
No detection
13 Movement of 
contaminated 
fomites from the 
index farm
Yes Probability of FMD transmission through 
contaminated fomites (Prob_Fomites)
Moderate [Uniform (0.3, 0.7)] As Node 2;  
(15, 38, 39)No
14 Movement of 
contaminated people 
from the index farma
Yes Probability of transmission through movement of 
people carrying the virus in their respiratory tract 
(Prob_People)
Low [Uniform (0.05, 0.3)] As Node 2;  
(15, 40, 41)No
aMovement of people carrying FMD infective particles in the upper respiratory tract.
TaBle 4 | continued
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TaBle 5 | Quantitative (median, 5 and 95 percentiles) and qualitative estimates of the likelihood of exposure of a pig from a piggery to FMD-infected 
meat previously illegally introduced into australia, according to potential pathways of exposure and piggery type.
exposure 
pathway
Descriptiona Quantitative and qualitative estimatesb
small-scale piggeries selling 
through informal means
small-scale piggeries 
selling at saleyards and 
abattoirs
large-scale  
piggeries
1 The FMD-infected meat gets to a household without pigs 
and some is discarded as waste – waste accessible to 
feral pigs, which become infected – Infected feral pigs get 
in contact with a pig from the exposure piggery
1.51 × 10−7 1.59 × 10−7 7.62 × 10−8
(1.32 × 10−8 to 2.74 × 10−4) (1.45 × 10−8 to 2.99 × 10−4) (7.30 × 10−9 to 1.00 × 10−4)
Negligible Negligible Negligible
2 The FMD-infected meat gets to the exposure piggery and 
some is discarded as waste – waste is directly fed to a pig 
from the same the piggery
7.80 × 10−6 6.65 × 10−5 3.46 × 10−5
(3.82 × 10−6 to 1.66 × 10−5) (3.29 × 10−5 to 1.33 × 10−4) (1.65 × 10−5 to 7.14 × 10−5)
Extremely low Extremely low Extremely low
3 The FMD-infected meat gets to the exposure piggery and 
some is discarded as waste – waste accessible to feral 
pigs, which become infected – infected feral pigs get in 
contact with a pig from the same piggery
4.00 × 10−12 4.23 × 10−11 1.19 × 10−11
(3.72 × 10−13 to 6.91 × 10−9) (3.94 × 10−12 to 
7.63 × 10−8)
(1.10 × 10−12 to 1.59 × 10−8)
Negligible Negligible Negligible
4 The FMD-infected meat gets to a non-exposure piggery, 
and some is discarded as waste – waste accessible to 
feral pigs, which become infected – infected feral pigs get 
in contact with a pig from the exposure piggery
4.98 × 10−11 2.43 × 10−11 1.64 × 10−11
(4.16 × 10−12 to 8.80 × 10−8) (2.23 × 10−12 to 
4.54 × 10−8)
(1.54 × 10−12 to 2.22 × 10−8)
Negligible Negligible Negligible
Overall The FMD-infected meat gets in contact with pigs from the 
exposure piggery
8.69 × 10−6 7.26 × 10−5 3.81 × 10−5
(4.03 × 10−6 to 2.83 × 10−4) (3.36 × 10−5 to 3.98 × 10−4) (1.77 × 10−5 to 1.40 × 10−4)
Extremely low Extremely low Extremely low
aExposure piggery = small-scale pig producers selling through informal means, small-scale pig producers selling through saleyards and abattoirs or large-scale pig producers 
according to the assessment.
bQuantitative estimates are the output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 50,000 iterations; qualitative estimates are based on the median and the likelihood ranges 
described at the Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis (DAFF, 2004).
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Assessment of the Risks of FMD Spread from 
Small-Scale Pig Producers
Table 6 shows a description of the potential outbreak scenarios 
and the likelihood of each of these scenarios to occur once FMD 
virus has been introduced into a small-scale piggery. The likeli-
hood of five of the six main potential outbreak scenarios has been 
evaluated in this assessment. Among these scenarios and for 
small-scale producers selling through informal means, the most 
likely potential outbreak scenarios, with a similar likelihood of 
occurring, are Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3, and Scenario 5. 
Scenario 1, representing no spread of FMD beyond the index 
farm, has a 0.193 (Low) probability to occur, as the ability of the 
farmer to detect FMD in pigs is estimated low. The probability of 
Scenarios 2 and 5 to occur is estimated 0.137 and 0.100, respec-
tively (Low). In these scenarios, the FMD-infected animals at 
the index farm are not detected and the virus spread from this 
farm through movement of pigs or ruminants. The extent of the 
spread and the impact of the consequences will depend on the 
destination of the animals moving off the farm. The likelihood 
of Scenario 3 to occur is estimated similar, with a probability of 
0.175 (Low). This scenario represents the spread of the FMD virus 
through the movement of contaminated fomites independently 
of the farmer detection. The virus could spread to another farm, 
saleyards, or abattoirs. The low frequency of movement of pigs 
and ruminants from this type of piggeries is the main reason why 
there is a low probability of spread through movement of animals 
(Scenarios 2 and 5) and fomites (Scenario 3).
Within Scenario 2, Table 2 describes the potential outbreak 
scenarios through movement of pigs from a small-scale piggery 
selling informally according to the destination of the FMD-
infected pigs. The most likely scenario is the spread of FMD virus 
to another small-scale piggery where the FMD-infected pigs are 
not detected (Scenario b), with a likelihood of occurring of 0.102 
(Low). This scenario is more likely to occur than the rest of sce-
narios involving movement of pigs off the index farm as the main 
destination of pigs from a small-scale piggery selling through 
informal means is another small-scale piggery. The less likely 
scenarios are those involving spread to saleyards and abattoirs.
Among the five main potential outbreak scenarios from a 
small-scale piggery selling at saleyards and abattoirs, the most 
likely scenarios are Scenario 2, Scenario 3, and Scenario 5, all with 
a Moderate likelihood of occurring (Table 6). The likelihood of 
Scenarios 2 and 3 for this group of producers was estimated higher 
than those obtained for small-scale piggeries selling through 
informal means, given movements of pigs from small-scale pig-
geries selling at saleyards and abattoirs were reported to be more 
frequent than those from small-scale piggeries selling informally 
and a lower proportion of these producers had boots and/or over-
alls for on-farm use only. Spread of FMD virus through movement 
of people carrying the virus in their respiratory tract (Scenario 4) 
was estimated to be 0.175 (Low) as the virus only survives for up 
to 28 h in the human respiratory tract, these farms do not usually 
employ external staff to work in the piggery, and over half of these 
farms have controlled entry of visitors and wash their hands after 
TaBle 6 | Quantitative (median, 5 and 95 percentiles) and qualitative estimates of the likelihood of the potential outbreak scenarios for the introduction 
and spread of foot-and-mouth disease in small-scale piggeries in australia.
Outbreak 
scenarios
Quantitative and qualitative estimatea Descriptionb
small-scale piggery selling 
through informal means
small-scale piggery selling at 
saleyards and abattoirs
1 0.193 (0.122–0.272), Low 0.092 (0.060–0.122), Low Infection detected at the exposure farm: no FMD spread beyond the exposure farm
2 0.137 (0.107–0.171), Low 0.382 (0.325–0.445), Moderate Infection not detected at the exposure farm: spread of FMD through movement of 
pigs off farm (any destination)
 a 0.006 (0.003–0.012), Very low 0.014 (0.010–0.018), Very low FMD spread to another small-scale piggery where infected pigs are detected
 b 0.102 (0.074–0.132), Low 0.054 (0.042–0.067), Low FMD spread to another small-scale piggery where infected pigs are not detected
 e 0.011 (0.006–0.017), Very low 0.004 (0.003–0.006), Very low FMD spread to a private individual (pigs kept as pets) where infected pigs are 
detected
 f 0.031 (0.018–0.050), Very low 0.012 (0.008–0.017), Very low FMD spread to a private individual (pigs kept as pets) where infected pigs are not 
detected
 g 0.009 (0.004–0.018), Very low 0.002 (0.001–0.003), Very low FMD spread to an agricultural show where infected pigs are detected
 h 0.009 (0.004–0.019), Very low 0.002 (0.001–0.004), Very low FMD spread to an agricultural show where infected pigs are not detected
 i 0.035 (0.021–0.054), Very low 0.097 (0.080–0.117), Low FMD spread to a property where pigs are killed for home consumption (home-kill)
 j 0.001 (0.000–0.005), Very low 0.119 (0.090–0.153), Low FMD spread to a saleyard (livestock market) where infected pigs are detected
k 0.001 (0.000–0.006), Very low 0.133 (0.099–0.168), Low FMD spread to a saleyard (livestock market) where infected pigs are not detected
 l 0.003 (0.000–0.008), Very low 0.020 (0.013–0.027), Very low FMD spread to a domestic abattoir where infected pigs are detected
 m 0.003 (0.001–0.010), Very low 0.026 (0.019–0.033), Very low FMD spread to a domestic abattoir where infected pigs are not detected
3 0.175 (0.062–0.287), Low 0.499 (0.320–0.680), Moderate Spread of FMD virus from the index farm through movement of contaminated 
fomites
4 0.026 (0.003–0.048), Very low 0.175 (0.062–0.287), Low Spread of FMD virus from the index farm through movement of people carrying 
infective particles of virus in the respiratory tract 
5 0.100 (0.037–0.183), Low 0.421 (0.270–0.600), Moderate Infection not detected at the exposure farm: spread of FMD through movement of 
ruminants off farm (any destination)
aQuantitative estimates are the output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 50,000 iterations; qualitative estimates are based on the median and the likelihood ranges 
described at the Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis (DAFF, 2004).
bExposure piggery = small-scale pig producers selling through informal means or small-scale pig producers selling through saleyards and abattoirs according to the assessment.
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handling the pigs. However, this estimate is higher than the esti-
mate for small-scale piggeries selling through informal means, 
as the latter group of producers have better on-farm practices, 
which could avoid the spread of the virus through contaminated 
people. Scenario 1 (0.092, Low), representing detection of FMD 
at the index farm and no spread beyond this farm, has a similar 
estimate than for the previous group of producers. This scenario 
has the lowest probability of occurring as the probability of the 
farmer detecting and reporting at these piggeries was estimated 
lower than for the other groups of producers.
Regarding those scenarios involving movement of pigs off the 
index farm to different destinations, the most likely scenarios to 
occur in this group of pig producers are Scenario j (0.119, Low) 
and k (0.133, Low), representing movement of pigs to saleyards, 
where infection is or is not detected, respectively.
Assessment of the Risks of FMD Spread from 
Large-Scale Pig Producers
The six main outbreak scenarios are the same than those described 
for small-scale pig producers; however, scenarios involving 
movement of pigs off the index farm differed depending on 
the destination of these animals. Table  7 shows the potential 
outbreak scenarios and the likelihood of each of these scenarios 
to occur once FMD virus has been introduced into a large-scale 
piggery. If FMD is introduced into a large-scale piggery, the most 
likely scenarios to occur are Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. Scenario 
1, with a probability of 0.317 (Moderate), represents detection 
of FMD at the index farm and no spread beyond this farm. The 
likelihood of this scenario in large-scale piggeries is higher than 
that in both groups of small-scale piggeries, as the ability to detect 
disease among large-scale producers is estimated higher than 
that for small-scale producers and there is a lower proportion 
of large-scale producer with ruminants on the farm, limiting 
the potential spread off the farm through this species. The likeli-
hood of Scenario 3 to occur was estimated 0.499 (Moderate). 
This estimate is the same than the estimate for this scenario for 
small-scale piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs. Spread of 
FMD through movement of pigs (Scenario 2) when the infection 
has not been detected has a probability of occurring of 0.263 
(Low). This probability is higher than that for the same scenario 
in small-scale piggeries selling through informal means, due 
to the more frequent movements of pigs, but lower than that 
estimated for small-scale piggeries selling through saleyards and 
abattoirs, as the producer in a large-scale piggeries is more likely 
TaBle 7 | Quantitative (median, 5 and 95 percentiles) and qualitative estimates of the likelihood of the potential outbreak scenarios for the introduction 
and spread of foot-and-mouth disease in large-scale piggeries (>100 sows) in australia.
Outbreak  
scenarios
Quantitative and qualitative 
estimatea
Description
1 0.317 (0.199–0.444), Moderate Infection detected at the exposure farm: no FMD spread beyond the exposure farm
2 0.263 (0.176–0.372), Low Infection not detected at the exposure farm: spread of FMD through movement of animals off farm (any destination)
 a 0.024 (0.018–0.032), Very low FMD spread to another large-scale piggery where infected pigs are detected
 b 0.023 (0.016–0.035), Very Low FMD spread to another large-scale piggery where infected pigs are not detected
 c 0.011 (0.008–0.014), Very low FMD spread to a small-scale piggery where infected pigs are detected
 d 0.044 (0.032–0.055), Very Low FMD spread to a small-scale piggery where infected pigs are not detected
 j 0.031 (0.021–0.042), Very low FMD spread to a saleyard (livestock market) where infected pigs are detected
 k 0.039 (0.028–0.059), Very low FMD spread to a saleyard (livestock market) where infected pigs are not detected
 l 0.157 (0.118–0.197), Low FMD spread to an abattoir where infected pigs are detected
 m 0.150 (0.105–0.235), Low FMD spread to an abattoir where infected pigs are not detected
3 0.499 (0.320–0.680), Moderate Spread of FMD virus from the index farm through movement of contaminated fomites
4 0.175 (0.062–0.287), Low Spread of FMD virus from the index farm through movement of people carrying infective particles of virus in the 
respiratory tract
5 0.218 (0.0.116–0.334), Low Infection not detected at the exposure farm: spread of FMD through movement of ruminants off farm (any 
destination)
aQuantitative estimates are the output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 50,000 iterations; Qualitative estimates are based on the median and the likelihood ranges 
described at the Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis (DAFF, 2004).
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to detect FMD than that in the small-scale piggery. Similarly, the 
likelihood of spread through movement of ruminants (Scenario 
5; 0.218, Low) is lower than that in small-scale piggeries selling 
at saleyards and abattoirs but higher than that in small-scale pig-
geries selling informally.
Among the scenarios of spread due to movement of pigs off 
the index farm (Scenario 2), the most likely scenarios were those 
where pigs were sent to the abattoir (Scenario l and m, approxi-
mately 0.150, Low), as this was the most common destination of 
pigs from large-scale piggeries.
sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity of the probability of exposure and the spread 
scenarios to some of the input variables was evaluated in this 
assessment. The input variable with most influence on the prob-
ability of exposure for all exposure groups is the amount of FMD-
infected meat illegally introduced into Australia. However, even 
when the model assumes that 200 kg of FMD-infected meat has 
been introduced into Australia, the probability that pigs would 
be exposed to FMD is Very low in large-scale and small-scale 
producers selling at saleyards and abattoirs and Extremely low in 
small-scale producers selling informally. When the probability of 
producers feeding swill to the pigs was increased to 0.9, there was 
a two- to sevenfold increase in the probability of exposure for 
all exposure groups; however, the probability was still considered 
Extremely low.
Results of the sensitivity analysis on Scenario 1 and Scenario 
2 for each group of pig producers are presented in Figure 3. 
For Scenario 1 (no spread beyond the index farm) among 
small-scale pig producers, the input parameter most influential 
on the output of the model is the presence of ruminants on 
the farm. A significant proportion of these producers stated 
having ruminants on the farm. If the proportion of producers 
with ruminants in the piggery is decreased to only 10% (base 
value 82–85%), the likelihood of Scenario 1, increases 35 
and 18% in the small-scale producers selling informally and 
in those selling at saleyards and abattoirs, respectively. For 
large-scale producers, the probability of the farmer detecting 
FMD in pigs is the input value with the most influence on 
the output probability of Scenario 1, with 18% increase in the 
probability of FMD not spreading form the index farm when 
detection in pigs is 0.9 (base value 0.56). A similar influence 
of the probability of FMD detection is seen among small-scale 
producers selling informally. The probability of spread through 
movement of infective pigs off the farm (Scenario 2) decreases 
when increasing the probability of the farmer detecting in 
pigs and ruminants for the three groups of pig producers. The 
influence of these input variables is more significant among 
large-scale and small-scale pig producers selling at saleyards 
and abattoirs (decrease of up to 25%). As expected, movement 
of pigs off farm influences the probability of Scenario 2 for all 
piggery types. The probability of spread through movement of 
contaminated fomites has a significant influence on the occur-
rence Scenario 3, given this model assume that the virus would 
spread through fomites independently of the farmer detecting 
the disease. When Prob_Fomites is reduced to 0.1 (from a base 
value of 0.5 for large-scale piggeries and small-scale pigger-
ies selling through saleyards and abattoirs), there is a fivefold 
decrease in the probability of spread through this pathway. 
These results stress the importance of maintaining appropriate 
biosecurity practices to minimize the spread of FMD through 
fomites, such as pig transport and visitor vehicles, clothes and 
equipment. For Scenario 5 (spread through movement of rumi-
nants), the input value with the most influence on the model 
output is the probability of movement of ruminants during the 
infective period. However, the influence is different among the 
FigUre 3 | Outputs of a sensitivity analysis investigating the influence of different input variables to the median (vertical line) probability of two 
spread scenarios [left: no spread beyond the index farm (Scenario 1); right: spread through movement of infective pigs (Scenario 2)] of foot-and-
mouth disease that has previously been introduced in a piggery in australia (sensitivity analysis with 5,000 iterations using @risk’s advanced 
sensitivity analysis) (Prob_1stDet_Rum, Probability of farmer detecting FMD in ruminants; Prob_1stDet, Probability of farmer detecting FMD in pigs; 
Prob_MovPigs, Probability of movement of pigs during infective period; Prop_Rum, Presence of ruminants).
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three groups of pig producers as seen in Figure 4. The prob-
ability of detecting FMD in ruminants has also an important 
influence on the probability of Scenario 5 occurring, especially 
among small-scale piggeries selling through saleyards and 
abattoirs, which are those with an estimated lower probability 
of detection (base value 0.24). When detection in these pigger-
ies is improved to 0.89, the probability of Scenario 5 occurring 
decreases by 13.5-folds.
DiscUssiOn
Several studies have suggested that small-scale pig producers are 
more likely to introduce and spread emergency animal diseases 
(EAD) compared to large-scale pig producers (1, 8, 10, 11, 47, 
48), with the lack of appropriate isolation for incoming animals, 
the use of saleyards for trading pigs, their poor knowledge on 
EADs and their low compliance with legislative requirements 
for keeping pigs being the main reasons for this suggestion. 
The  current study is the first comparative assessment on the 
FMD introduction and spread risks posed by small and large-
scale piggeries in Australia, which has used extensive data on 
producers’ practices. Data used to populate the models in this 
study is based on several quantitative and qualitative studies 
among small-scale pig producers in Eastern Australia conducted 
between 2005 and 2009. These studies, which aimed to investigate 
biosecurity and surveillance among this sector of the pig industry, 
have been previously described as providing baseline information 
on practices and attitudes toward biosecurity among small-scale 
pig producers in Australia (8). Subsequent studies suggest that 
biosecurity practices among pig producers have not significantly 
changed since (48–50). However, although estimates used for the 
current assessments are considered an accurate representation 
of practices among pig producers in the country, some practices 
of producers located in Western areas of the country might not 
be appropriately represented. The model assumed that FMD was 
introduced through the illegal importation of 5 kg of cured or 
FigUre 4 | influence of different input variables to the median 
(vertical line) of the scenario of spread through movement of infective 
ruminants of foot-and-mouth disease that has previously been 
introduced in a piggery in australia (sensitivity analysis with 1,000 
iterations using @risk’s advanced sensitivity analysis) (Prob_1stDet_
Rum, probability of farmer detecting FMD in ruminants; Prob_1stDet, 
probability of farmer detecting FMD in pigs; Prop_Rum, presence of 
ruminants; Prob_MovRum, probability of movement of ruminants 
during infective period).
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salted meat and that the virus survived until exposure occurred. 
We acknowledge that to accurately estimate the probability of 
exposure of domestic pigs due to illegal introduction of infected 
meat, virus survival should be considered; however, the aim of 
this study was to identify biosecurity practices posing a risk for 
disease introduction and spread in piggeries and compare this 
risk between different sectors of the pig industry. These sectors 
were, small-scale piggeries selling through informal means, 
small-scale piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs and large-
scale piggeries. Results of the probabilities of exposure and spread 
posed by each sector of the industry should be considered relative 
among the three sectors of the industry.
The probability of exposure of a piggery to the FMD virus, 
which has been introduced into Australia through the illegal 
importation of 5  kg of FMD-infected cured or salted meat 
products was estimated Extremely low for the three groups of 
piggeries. One of the factors driving this low probability is the 
fact that this assessment considered households without and with 
pigs having an even probability of illegally introducing meat into 
the country and most households in Australia do not keep pigs. 
As such, the probability of the illegally introduced meat being 
destined to a household with pigs is extremely low. There is no 
available data providing scientific evidence about households 
with pigs being more likely to illegally introduce FMD-infected 
meat into Australia than other households. However, data on 
illegal movements of meat products are needed to confirm this 
assumption. The most likely pathway of exposure according 
to this assessment is through the direct feeding of the infected 
meat to the pigs. In addition, the sensitivity analysis indicates 
that exposure is highly influenced the probability of producers 
to swill feed pigs. Swill feeding was estimated to be more likely 
among small-scale producers; however, estimates of swill feeding 
were incorporated in the model with significant uncertainty as 
they were based on information on feeding practices of producers 
collected during questionnaires and interviews (8, 9, 12). More 
accurate information on swill feeding incidence among large and 
small-scale pig producers in Australia would improve validity 
of the results. Mathews (51), in a report assessing Australia’s 
current level of preparedness and capacity to prevent and 
respond to an outbreak of FMD, identified the effectiveness 
of swill feeding prohibitions, especially among periurban and 
small-scale pig producers, as one of the areas that required 
attention. As previously described, swill feeding has been 
identified as posing the major risk for FMD introduction 
and establishment in Australia, through illegally introduced 
FMD-contaminated meat or dairy products (15, 51). Similarly, 
the illegal importation of meat, which is subsequently fed to 
pigs as swill, has been identified as the potential cause of the 
introduction of emergency diseases, such as CSF and ASF (20, 
22, 23). As Schembri et al. (8) indicates, a program involving 
appropriate swill feeding investigations and effective educa-
tion and enforcement strategies, supported by a consistent 
national definition of swill feeding is required to improve cur-
rent data on swill feeding incidence and producers’ awareness and 
compliance.
According to results from these assessments, once FMD has 
been introduced into a piggery, the most likely pathway of spread 
is through contaminated fomites (Scenario 3). Spread of FMD 
through contaminated vehicles, equipment or clothing with 
poor or absent appropriate disinfection has been reported as an 
important pathway of FMD spread from infected properties (15, 
52, 53). Spread through this pathway is estimated less likely to 
occur among small-scale piggeries selling informally due to the 
low frequency of animal and vehicle movements and the non-use 
of external staff in these properties compared to other piggeries.
In the current assessment, a similar probability of spread 
through this pathway was estimated for large- and small-scale 
piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs. Large-scale pig pro-
ducers have been reported to have better on-farm biosecurity 
practices in Australia (8, 48) and other countries, such as Finland 
(47) and United States (54), with these studies suggesting that 
large-scale producers might perceive the impact of disease as 
more significant for their enterprise. However, pig movements off 
farm among large-scale enterprises are frequent and all employ 
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external staff, which could contribute to the spread of the virus 
through contaminated fomites. By contrast, among small-scale 
pig producers selling at saleyards and abattoirs pig movements 
off farm are not as frequent as those among large-scale pig pro-
ducers. This scenario was considered independent of the farmer 
detecting the infection, as movement of contaminated fomites 
could occur before detection of clinical signs occurs, given 
shedding of the virus could start during the pre-clinical phase 
of the disease (15, 53). It could be argued that the earlier FMD is 
detected the less likely the virus would spread through fomites. 
According to available data, large-scale producers are considered 
more likely to early detect FMD-infected animals than small-
scale producers, and as a consequence, spread through fomites 
in large-scale piggeries would be less likely to occur. Given this 
has not been considered in this assessment, the probability of 
Scenario 3 to occur in large-scale piggeries could be somewhat 
overestimated.
The next spread scenario with highest probability among all 
producers was the spread of FMD through movement of pigs 
from the index farm (Scenario 2). Similarly than for Scenario 3, 
spread through movement of pigs was less likely to occur among 
small-scale piggeries selling informally due to the lower number 
of pigs kept on the farm and frequency of pig movements off the 
farm. However, although the probability of this scenario of spread 
was lower than for other piggeries, movement of pigs to non-
commercial pathways could jeopardize animal traceability in the 
event of a disease outbreak. Some of these pig properties are not 
registered within government and/or industry databases, chal-
lenging the ability to trace back animal movements in the event of 
an EAD outbreak and increasing the potential magnitude of the 
outbreak. A recent study among 198 small-scale pig producers 
in Australia reported over 85% of participant producers moving 
pigs off their property in the last 12 months, ~10% of producers 
not recording animal movements and 3% not having a legally 
required property identification code for their property (49). 
Mathews (51) identified the poor understanding on the number 
and location of small holder producers in Australia and the need 
for a national register as critical for the management of EADs. For 
this scenario, the main differences between the three sectors of the 
pig industry were the different destinations of pigs being moved 
off the property. While pigs from small-scale piggeries selling 
informally are mainly moved to other properties keeping pigs, 
pigs from small-scale piggeries selling at saleyards and abattoirs 
are mainly sent to saleyards and pigs from large-scale piggeries 
are sent to abattoirs. This will affect the potential magnitude of the 
spread of FMD before the outbreak is detected and the potential 
strategies to reduce the risks of spread. The ability of detecting 
FMD-infected animals at saleyards and abattoirs, where animals 
from different origins are commingled, is crucial for limiting the 
spread of the disease. The estimates of FMD detection used in 
the current assessments are based on a study by Hernández-Jover 
et al. (35), who conducted a quantitative evaluation of the likeli-
hood of exotic disease detection with passive disease surveillance 
activities for pigs at saleyards and abattoirs in eastern Australia. 
This study indicates that although the probability of detecting 
FMD at these locations was high when assuming a herd and unit 
design prevalence of 1 and 30%, respectively, the probability of 
early detecting FMD at these venues could be improved. This 
study identified the improvement of disease awareness of sale-
yard and abattoir stockmen, increased presence of inspectors at 
these venues and identification of high-risk herds as approaches 
for enhancing the capacity of the country for early detection of 
emerging animal diseases. As suggested by several studies, the 
use of a risk-based surveillance approach, with surveillance being 
focused at locations with high-risk animals could result in more 
efficient allocation of resources (55–57).
The sensitivity analysis indicates that for all piggery types, 
spread of the virus is highly influenced by the probability of the 
farmer detecting FMD and the presence of ruminants on the farm. 
No spread beyond the index farm (Scenario 1) was more likely to 
occur in large-scale piggeries as these are considered more likely 
to detect disease and a lower proportion of these producers keep 
ruminants (8, 12). Early detection and reporting of FMD is crucial 
for limiting the spread of the virus and minimizing the potential 
impact of an outbreak. According to data available, small-scale 
pig producers have low awareness of EADs and the concept of 
shared responsibility in relation to the management of EADs. 
In addition, their contact with veterinarians is low and a lack of 
trust with government agencies has been identified (8, 49). As a 
consequence, these data suggest small-scale pig producers would 
be unlikely to detect FMD before the virus was spread to other 
livestock in other properties. Similarly, several previous studies 
identified lack of EAD awareness and negative attitudes toward 
disease reporting among livestock producers (58–61). Mathews 
(51) suggested that an incursion of FMD into Australia would 
not be readily detected, and identified these factors as contribut-
ing to the delayed detection of an FMD outbreak. Supporting 
this suggestion, modeling studies estimated an expected time 
to FMD detection after being introduced into the country of 
22–47 days (53, 56).
cOnclUsiOn
These assessments provide information regarding the relative 
order of magnitude of the risks of FMD introduction and spread 
among the three sectors of the pig industry, as well as the bios-
ecurity practices posing higher risks among piggeries for each of 
the sectors considered. This information can support decision-
making when prioritizing resource allocation for improving the 
capability of the pig industry to prevent and respond against 
emergency animal disease outbreaks. According to the results of 
this assessment, direct feeding of the infected meat to the pigs 
(swill feeding) is the most likely pathway of exposure, and the 
probability of this to occur is slightly higher among small-scale 
producers. If FMD is to be introduced into a piggery in Australia, 
spread is more likely to occur if this piggery is a small-scale 
piggery selling at saleyards and abattoirs with movement of con-
taminated fomites and movement of pigs and ruminants off the 
farm the most likely pathways of spread. Presence of ruminants 
on the farm and the probability of the farmer detecting FMD are 
the most influential factors for the spread of the virus. Although 
large-scale piggeries have higher probability of FMD spread than 
small-scale piggeries selling informally, they are easy to locate, 
are members of the pig industry body APL and do not use 
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